Is fiscal decentralization harmful for economic growth?: evidence from the OECD countries by Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Ezcurra, Roberto
  
Andre´s Rodrı´guez-Pose and Roberto Ezcurra 
Is fiscal decentralization harmful for 
economic growth?: evidence from the OECD 
countries 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Ezcurra, Roberto (2010) Is fiscal decentralization harmful for 
economic growth?: evidence from the OECD countries. Journal of Economic Geography, 11 (4). 
pp. 619-643. ISSN 1468-2702  
 
DOI: 10.1093/jeg/lbq025  
 
© 2011 The Authors 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/30796/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2014 
 
  
Is fiscal decentralization harmful for economic
growth? Evidence from the OECD countries
Andre´s Rodrı´guez-Pose*,**,y and Roberto Ezcurra***
*Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, London, WC2A 2AE, UK
**IMDEA Social Sciences Institute, Madrid, Spain
***Departamento de Economı´a, Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra, Campus de Arrosadia s/n, 31006
Pamplona, Spain
yCorresponding author: Andre´s Rodrı´guez-Pose, Department of Geography and Environment, London
School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. email5a.rodriguez-pose@lse.ac.uk4
Abstract
The global drive towards decentralization has been increasingly justified on the basis
that greater transfers of resources to subnational governments are expected to deliver
greater efficiency in the provision of public goods and services and greater economic
growth. This article examines whether this is the case, by analysing the relationship
between decentralization and economic growth in 21 Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development countries during the period between 1990 and 2005
and controlling not only for fiscal decentralization, but also for political and
administrative decentralization. The results point towards a negative and significant
association between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the sample
countries, a relationship which is robust to the inclusion of a series of control variables
and to differences in expenditure preferences by subnational governments. The impact
of political and administrative decentralization on economic growth is weaker and
sensitive to the definition and measurement of political decentralization.
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, administrative decentralization,
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1. Introduction
The recent global drive towards fiscal decentralization has often been promoted as
a means to achieve greater economic efficiency and growth. From the USA to
China, from Britain to Spain, greater transfers of resources and powers to subnational
tiers of governments have been increasingly justified as a means to improve economic
performance, both at the local and at the aggregate level, often sidelining the traditional
arguments of safeguarding local identity or culture (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Sandall, 2008).
This economic efficiency discourse has been prevalent both in cases of top-down fiscal
decentralization, as in the USA (Donohue, 1997) or the UK (Morgan, 2002; Tomaney,
2002), as well as in bottom-up processes, where regions and localities have taken the
lead in the process (e.g. Eusko Jauralitza, 2004).
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Yet the supposed ‘economic dividend’ (Morgan, 2002) derived from fiscal
decentralization has seldom been tested and the studies that have ventured into
exploring this field have come out with varying results. Although it is difficult to
generalize from what is a literature that spawns across different countries of the world
and uses a wide range of data sets and methods, the results of the studies that have
looked into the economic returns of fiscal decentralization range from a positive and
significant relationship (Iimi, 2005) to inverted U-shaped relationships (Thieen, 2003)
or neutral or mildly negative impacts (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips,
1998; Rodrı´guez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009).
However, with few exceptions, this type of research has concentrated on individual
countries. Cross-country comparisons are limited and those including a large number
of countries, such as those of the EU or the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), are few and far between (e.g. Thießen, 2003; Thornton,
2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009). In addition, when testing the relationship between
decentralization and growth, most of the literature has dwelt on one type of
decentralization—fiscal decentralization—disregarding the fact that other types of
decentralization, such as political and administrative decentralization, may also play a
non-negligible role in shaping policies, the provision of public goods and services and,
eventually, economic outcomes. The interaction between different types of decentral-
ization is also likely to influence the returns of subnational expenditure and revenue
efforts.
In this article we address this gap in the literature by looking at whether levels and
changes in the levels of fiscal decentralization across 21 countries of the OECD during
the period between 1990 and 2005 have had a positive or a negative effect on aggregate
national economic performance. In order to achieve this aim, we not only examine the
expenditure and revenue sides of fiscal decentralization, but also control for differences
in political and administrative decentralization across countries, as well as for a host of
other structural variables which, according to the literature, are considered to have an
effect on economic performance. In addition, in order to further check the robustness of
our results, we analyse whether the presence or absence of a significant association
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth may be a result of differences
in expenditure preferences by subnational governments. We specifically assess
whether preferences for current or capital expenditures across regions and across
countries in the OECD matter for economic growth, focusing later on the precise
impact of the decentralization of economic affairs, health, education and social
protection expenditure.
The article is divided according to the following structure. First, an overview of the
theoretical arguments on the link between fiscal decentralization and growth follows
this introduction. Section 3 weaves fiscal, political and administrative decentralization
into a theoretical model. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis of the impact
of decentralization on economic growth across the OECD. The final section introduces
the main conclusions.
2. Fiscal decentralization and growth: a theoretical overview
Most of the theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization has tended to dwell on the
supposedly positive impact of granting greater financial autonomy or transferring
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resources to subnational tiers of government for both allocative and production
efficiency and, eventually, economic growth (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980).
The arguments behind this potential positive association between fiscal decentral-
ization and economic performance are based on a series of simple premises.
An important, but often forgotten, initial premise is that fiscal decentralization implies
a mobilization of resources. Subnational governments, by the simple fact of being
granted greater autonomy and funds, are compelled into mobilizing the resources in
their own territory, rather than wait for solutions or for the provision of public goods
and services to come from a central, more remote, authority. This leads to a greater
emphasis on economic efficiency across regions and localities within any given country
and to tapping into what otherwise may have been untapped potential.
The best known mechanism through which fiscal decentralization may lead to greater
overall economic efficiency is the so-called ‘fiscal decentralization’ theorem: the fact
that, due to informational advantages and a better insight into the preferences of
citizens, local governments are more capable than national governments to tailor the
provision of public goods and services to the needs of local citizens (Tiebout, 1956;
Klugman, 1994). The possible economic advantages linked to the fiscal decentralization
theorem increase the larger and the more heterogeneous the country. Whether in small
and homogenous countries the informational benefits of conducting policies and
providing public goods and services at the local level may be limited, the advantages of
fiscal decentralization increase as internal heterogeneity makes individual preferences
more diverse (Oates, 1993; Martı´nez-Va´zquez and McNab, 2003). From this perspec-
tive, significant benefits from fiscal decentralization can be expected beyond a certain
country-size threshold.
Greater production efficiency and growth may also be triggered by the changes
in scale for the production of public policies and goods and services that fiscal
decentralization entails. The risk of citizens and firms being able to ‘vote with their feet’
and move to another location drives local governments to compete in order provide
better and more efficient policies (Tiebout, 1956; Donohue, 1997; Martı´nez-Va´zquez
and McNab 2003). Through competition, local governments are kept on their toes
limiting the possibility of inefficiency, rent-seeking and corrupt practices (Breton, 1996).
Competition, in turn, is at the heart of policy innovation. The smaller the geographical
scale of intervention, the lower the risks involved in—and the aggregate cost of—
pursuing innovation in the provision of public goods and services. Successful local
policies can then be transferred from one place to another, possibly leading to
significant aggregate efficiency gains (Donohue, 1997). Fiscal decentralization is also
frequently considered a means to promote more efficient markets (McKinnon, 1997;
Marks and Hooghe, 2004).
Decentralization also brings about important benefits when serious diseconomies of
scale exist. It is often the case that the cost of producing certain public goods tends to
rise significantly with size. This is particularly true when the delivery of public goods
and services is done by large, remote and/or often inefficient central bureaucracies
(Klugman, 1994). These bureaucracies are frequently less well suited to deliver specific
public goods more efficiently than the more supple local governments, as a consequence
of their closeness to the people and their better knowledge of their needs. Local delivery
also shortens supply chains and reduces costs, potentially generating greater economic
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth . 621
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efficiency and even reducing the risks associated with the loss of redistributive power by
the central government (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008).
Last but not least, fiscal decentralization is often considered as a way to increase
participation, transparency and accountability in policy-making (Putnam, 1993; Ebel
and Yilmaz, 2002). Because of the enhanced proximity between those governing and
those governed, fiscal decentralization empowers individuals and helps to generate
institutions, such as greater trust, interaction and networking, which, in turn, contribute
to a reduction of transaction costs.
While, from a theoretical perspective, there may be significant benefits associated
with fiscal decentralization, many authors have tended to focus on the other side of
the coin: that of the potential risks of decentralization for economic performance.
First of all, certain strands of research have cast doubt on the validity of the ‘fiscal
decentralization theorem’. Needs and wants for public goods and services may not
differ significantly across jurisdictions. Prud’homme argues that more than responding
to ‘fine differences in preferences between jurisdictions [governments have] to satisfy
basic needs, which are—at least in principle—quite well known’ (Prud’homme, 1995:
208). These basic needs of access to food, to decent education, to safety, to health care,
to basic infrastructure, and to other basic services are universal and do not differ greatly
from one region to another and the central government may be better suited to deliver
these goods. Second, even if we accept that needs vary across territories, capacity
constraints may limit the potential of subnational governments to make the most from
fiscal autonomy (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2005). It is far from proven that local and
regional governments have a clear comparative advantage with respect to national
governments in uncovering those differences (Prud’homme, 1995).
Poorer localities and regions may also be at a further disadvantage in delivering
efficient policies and strategies. Often times subnational governments—especially in the
less developed regions—lack the adequate expertise and human resources to put in
place viable policies and strategies, let alone to tailor those policies to the specific needs
of their citizens (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2004; Sapir et al., 2004). Because of the
generally greater salaries and the greater possibilities for promotion they offer, central
governments may have better and more efficient administrations than local and
regional governments, especially if these governments are poor, distant and strapped for
cash (Prud’homme, 1995). Moreover, richer and more dynamic regions can generally
extract greater resources, either through the taxation of their own citizens or through a
greater political leverage to negotiate with the central government (Rodrı´guez-Pose and
Gill, 2004). Limited local institutional capabilities may even undermine the capacity to
assimilate and adopt best practices (Oates, 1993; Odero, 2004). Local governments may
also fall prey to elite and special-interest capture (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2000; Storper,
2005) and may be likely to breed greater corruption, nepotism and clientelism.
Scale arguments may also be reversed. When large economies of scale and scope are
involved, local and regional governments often lack the necessary size to deliver public
goods and services efficiently—with the provision of transport infrastructure or utilities
being most at risk to fall into inefficiencies (Prud’homme, 1995). The benefits of central
government delivery are thus likely to be greater for capital intensive goods, where a
critical mass of investment is needed in order to reduce the per-unit cost of delivery
(Frenkel, 1986).
Given the points above, the possibility of matching policies to the specific needs of
the population may simply be a pipedream, as local and regional governments often do
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not have the necessary powers, resources, capacity and capabilities to be able to
adequately address local problems. Inadequate or unfunded mandates are common
in processes of decentralization and tend to seriously compromise the potential of
subnational governments to deliver better targeted and more efficient policies than
those of national governments (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2003).
Whether the positive or the negative economic effects of fiscal decentralization
prevail cannot be established using theory alone. The empirical work on the economic
effects of decentralization has, however, been limited and, as mentioned earlier,
generally reaches diverging conclusions. The reasons for this diversity are that
determining the impact of decentralization on local and regional development
empirically is difficult. There is no clear agreement about how to best measure
decentralization (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 6–7) and, even when the same indicators are
used, the methods and approaches vary enormously. In addition, there is hardly ever a
counterfactual, making it impossible to discern what would have happened to local and
regional growth trajectories in the absence of decentralization.
As a consequence, the question of whether decentralization promotes or deters
economic efficiency across the world is far from settled. Available empirical analyses
virtually fit every possible position. Some studies have found that there is a positive
association between decentralization and economic performance (Lin and Liu, 2000;
Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 2005). Others, in contrast, indicate that the relationship
can be negative (e.g. Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998, 2001). While
most tend to highlight that the link between decentralization and economic growth
varies from one region and one country to another and, in most cases, tends to be either
neutral or insignificant (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998;
Rodrı´guez-Pose and Bwire, 2004) or far from linear [e.g. Thießen (2003) uncovers a
hump-shaped relationship between decentralization and development, indicating the
potential existence of an optimal level of decentralization across countries] (Table 1).
3. Fiscal, political and administrative decentralization: the model
The aim of this section is to test empirically the practical relevance of the contrasting
theoretical arguments on the link between the degree of fiscal decentralization from
central to subnational governments and economic performance for 21 OECD countries
during the period between 1990 and 2005.
The first feature that strikes about fiscal decentralization in the OECD is its diversity.
If we take two widely used standard measures of fiscal decentralization—the
subnational share in total government expenditure and the subnational share in total
government revenue (e.g. Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and
Philips, 1998; Thießen, 2003; Iimi, 2005)1—the degree of fiscal decentralization varies
1 All the measures of fiscal decentralization used in the article are based on time series data gathered by the
International Monetary Fund in its Government and Finance Statistics database. It should be noted that
none of these indicators perfectly reflects all the dimensions and the complexity of the processes of fiscal
decentralization. Specifically, both expenditure and revenue indicators have been criticized for failing to
identify the degree of expenditure autonomy of subnational governments, for failing to differentiate
between tax and non-tax revenue sources, and for not determining what proportion of intergovernmental
transfers are discretionary or conditional (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 2005).
Nevertheless, lack of detailed information on the exact nature of the relations between the different
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considerably across the different countries in the sample. The most fiscally decentralized
countries are Switzerland, Germany and Canada, while at the opposite end of the scale,
we find Portugal, Luxembourg and the UK. The relative gap in the degree of fiscal
decentralization between Switzerland, the most decentralized country in the OECD,
and Portugal, the most centralized in the sample, is of an order of 4.6 times in terms of
expenditure and 3.9 times in terms of revenue (Table 2). Moreover, the level of fiscal
decentralization from central to subnational governments did not remain stable over
the period of analysis. Although there is no uniform pattern in this context, most of the
sample countries experienced an increase in their degree of fiscal decentralization
between 1990 and 2005, which is in line with the devolutionary trend observed
worldwide since the late 1970s (Dillinger, 1994; Woller and Phillips, 1998; World Bank,
2000; Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2005). Notable examples of this trend are Spain and
Mexico. In these two countries the decentralization processes were particularly intense,
with increases in subnational expenditure of more than 20% in both cases and of almost
11% in Spain and 36% in Mexico in terms of subnational revenue (Table 2), continuing
the devolutionary tendency already observed during the 1980s (Rodrı´guez-Pose and
Gill, 2004). However, the trend towards greater fiscal decentralization has not been
universal. Of the 21 countries included in the sample, 6 witnessed a relative reduction in
subnational expenditure—with a particularly strong incidence in the case of Norway—
while seven countries experienced a contraction in the relative weight of subnational
revenue (Table 2). The process of marginal recentralization was dominant in
Scandinavian countries, and in particular in Norway and Finland.
Table 1. The link between decentralization and economic performance
Author (year) Sample Period Findings
Akai and Sakata (2002) USA 1988–1996 Positive and significant
Baskaran and Feld (2009) 23 OECD countries 1975–2001 Negative, but not robust
Davoodi and Zou (1998) 46 countries 1970–1989 Developing: negative, but
not significant OECD:
no relationship
Iimi (2005) 51 countries 1997–2001 Positive and significant
Lin and Liu (2000) China 1970–1993 Positive and significant
Rodrı´guez-Pose and
Bwire (2004)
Germany, India,
Italy, Mexico,
Spain and USA
Different
periods
until 2001
Mostly insignificant,
with the exceptions of Mexico,
the US, and, partially, India,
where it becomes negative
Stansel (2005) US metropolitan areas 1960–1990 Positive and significant
Thießen (2003) 26 countries 1973–1998 Hump-shaped relationship
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD countries 1980–2000 Not statistically significant
Woller and Phillips (1998) 23 less developed
countries (LDCs)
1974–1991 No relationship
Zhang and Zou (1998) China 1980–1992 Negative and significant
Zhang and Zou (2001) China 1987–1993 Negative and significant
Source: Adapted and updated from Rodrı´guez-Pose et al. (2009).
government levels in each country leaves us with no reliable alternative for large cross-country
comparisons (Thießen, 2003; Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2004).
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Has the tendency towards greater fiscal decentralization been associated with
economic growth across the OECD? Figures 1 and 2 plot the average growth rate of
real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the study period on the average
values of the two measures of fiscal decentralization considered and give an initial
assessment of the main research question driving the article. The simple linear
association between both phenomena seems to show the existence of a negative
relationship between the degree of fiscal decentralization and the economic growth in
OECD countries between 1990 and 2005. The corresponding correlation coefficients,
with values of 0.436 (p¼ 0.048) and 0.472 (p¼ 0.031), for expenditure and revenue
respectively, confirm this impression. Neither of the plots is affected by significant
outliers that may be behind this pattern.
The information provided by Figures 1 and 2 should, in any case, be interpreted with
caution, as economic growth does not depend exclusively on the degree of fiscal
decentralization of a country (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi,
2005; Thornton, 2007) and omitted variables may ultimately lie behind the observed
negative relationship. In addition, the transfer of power and resources from central to
subnational governments is a multidimensional process (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002;
Stegarescu, 2005) and the potential influence of the degree of fiscal decentralization on
Table 2. Fiscal decentralization trends in the OECD countries, 1990–2005
Decentralization Total expenditure Total revenue
Country Mean Std. dev.  (%) Mean Std. dev.  (%)
Australia 0.383 0.012 0.88 0.400 0.016 0.10
Austria 0.416 0.013 1.15 0.463 0.023 4.35
Belgium 0.437 0.022 4.56 0.455 0.013 3.89
Canada 0.603 0.019 6.34 0.626 0.009 0.91
Denmark 0.509 0.014 0.08 0.501 0.009 0.48
Finland 0.480 0.026 6.06 0.532 0.071 7.52
France 0.301 0.013 0.13 0.334 0.015 5.36
Germany 0.608 0.075 13.67 0.680 0.024 5.99
Iceland 0.265 0.044 11.18 0.291 0.037 13.18
Ireland 0.274 0.025 7.26 0.293 0.036 7.88
Italy 0.328 0.055 14.92 0.394 0.030 4.03
Luxembourg 0.204 0.012 5.11 0.216 0.008 0.88
Mexico 0.332 0.077 28.29 0.380 0.102 35.98
Netherlands 0.374 0.021 5.35 0.427 0.035 5.94
Norway 0.349 0.062 21.73 0.250 0.020 5.34
Portugal 0.149 0.015 2.24 0.179 0.028 10.11
Spain 0.452 0.072 21.03 0.529 0.036 10.98
Sweden 0.422 0.031 2.05 0.461 0.034 4.71
Switzerland 0.687 0.035 10.51 0.711 0.021 4.73
United Kingdom 0.232 0.018 4.37 0.244 0.017 1.21
United States 0.563 0.031 8.55 0.623 0.019 1.95
Note: Fiscal decentralization is measured as the subnational share in total government expenditure and the
subnational share in total government revenue.
Source: International Monetary Fund’s Government and Finance Statistics.
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Figure 1. Decentralization of total expenditure and economic growth in the OECD.
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Figure 2. Decentralization of total revenue and economic growth in the OECD.
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economic performance may be affected by country differences in political and
administrative decentralization.
In view of this, and in order to really test whether fiscal decentralization matters for
economic growth, we estimate of the following econometric model:
gcðtþ5Þt ¼ þ FDct þ PDc þ ADc þ hXct þ "ct ð1Þ
where g is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita in country c; FD, PD and AD
are respectively the measures of fiscal, political and administrative decentralization; X
is a vector of variables that control for other factors assumed to influence growth;
and finally " is the corresponding disturbance term. Our main interest lies in the
coefficient of the variable capturing the effect of the degree of fiscal decentralization
(FD)—both on the expenditure and the revenue side—of the sample countries. As this
variable is not expected to affect year-to-year fluctuations in growth, we work with
growth rates averaged over 5-year periods, as is usual in the literature. All the
estimations of model (1) carried out in this section are based on heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West, 1987, 1994).
Fiscal decentralization is, however, not the only type of decentralization that
may have some bearing on economic performance. Processes of decentralization are
not limited to the transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government (fiscal
decentralization), but also include varying degrees of transfers of powers (political
decentralization) and the granting of autonomy to subcentral entities relative to central
government (administrative decentralization). No two processes of decentralization are
equal and there is often a mismatch between the levels of fiscal, political and
administrative decentralization. Differences in legitimacy between subnational actors,
on the one hand, and the central or federal state, on the other, are often at the root of
huge cross-country variations in transfers of political power and economic resources to
subnational governments (Donohue, 1997). Top-down processes of decentralization
are, in particular, characterized by a mismatch between a significant transfer of powers
and an often limited transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government
(Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill, 2003). OECD countries are no exception and the majority
of the countries included in the sample register significant differences between their
degree of fiscal, political and administrative decentralization (Schneider, 2003).
As in the case of fiscal decentralization, measurements of political and administrative
decentralization are not without controversy. Virtually every individual or group of
researchers who have looked into this question have come out with a different index for
these two types of decentralization. Two well-known sources of indicators of political
decentralization are Schneider (2003) and Hooghe et al. (2008). Schneider’s (2003)
indices have the advantage of a greater territorial breadth of coverage, including all 21
countries in our sample, and make an explicit distinction between political and
administrative decentralization. The main drawback is that Schneider’s (2003) index is
only available for 1996, which limits the potential to apply certain econometric models.
Hooghe et al. (2008) indices are richer and cover a relatively large number of political,
fiscal and institutional aspects of decentralization—including, among others, aspects
such as institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, representation or executive
control—for 42 countries during the period between 1950 and 2006. They also allow for
a limited variation over time. Measures of administrative decentralization are, however,
less explicitly covered than in Schneider’s (2003) index and one of the countries in our
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sample (Mexico) is not included. None of the two sets of indicators is exempt from
criticism and there is significant variation in the results. Consequently, the use of one
or the other set of indicators implies considerable risks and may bias the results. We
therefore resort to both Schneider’s (2003) and Hooghe et al.’s (2008)2 indices as our
proxies for political decentralization.
The X vector includes different variables identified in the literature as potentially
important determinants of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). In addition to
the initial GDP per capita of every country, we consider the level of physical and human
capital, measured respectively as the net capital stock per unit of GDP and the average
years of schooling of the total population aged 15 years and over. We also include the
average population growth rate and the degree of trade openness, calculated following
standard practice as the ratio between total trade (exports and imports) and GDP.3 As
the observed link between fiscal decentralization and economic growth may be a
spurious correlation resulting from ignoring existing differences in the size of the public
sector in the various countries (Ram, 1986; Mo, 2007), we introduce the public sector
size as our final control variable. Public sector size is measured as the share of total
public expenditure in national GDP.4
With the only exception of the population growth rate and the time-invariant
measures of political—Schneider’s (2003) index—and administrative decentralization,
all the explanatory variables were measured at the beginning of the corresponding
5-year period in order to minimize any potential endogeneity problem. Table 3 provides
different descriptive statistics for the different variables employed in our analysis.
4. The relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth
in the OECD
Table 4 presents the results obtained when different versions of model (1) are estimated
by OLS using the subnational share in total government expenditure as the measure of
fiscal decentralization. As can be observed, the inclusion of this indicator in our
reduced-form growth model yields interesting results. First and foremost, the coefficient
of the measure of fiscal decentralization is in all cases negative and statistically
significant. This indicates that the subnational share in total government expenditure is
negatively associated with economic growth in the sample countries, which is consistent
with the preliminary evidence provided by Figure 1. The different specifications
2 In the case of Hooghe et al.’s (2008) indices, we resort to their policy scope indicator as the measure of
political decentralization. The policy scope indicator ‘taps regional authority over policy making’
(Hooghe et al., 2008: 125). In this index these authors estimate ‘the range of policies over which
governments make authoritative decisions’ in areas related to economic, cultural-educational and welfare
policies, as well as over aspects of constitutive or coercive authority and over membership of the
community (Hoogher et al., 2008: 125–126).
3 Although growth regressions usually do not include the country size as a control variable, we considered
the possibility of including country size as an additional control variable. Country size is, however, highly
correlated with the Hooghe et al.’s (2008) political decentralization index, raising problems of
multicollinearity in the analysis. This reinforces the view of that size and decentralization go hand in
hand, with countries with larger populations registering higher levels of political decentralization (Hooghe
et al., 2010).
4 The data for these variables are drawn from different sources, which include the World Development
Indicators (World Bank), AMECO (European Commission), Barro and Lee (2000), and the International
Monetary Fund’s Government and Finance Statistics.
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estimated in Table 4 show that this finding is robust to the inclusion of additional
explanatory variables in the analysis (Regressions 4.2–4.7) and to differences in the
measurement of political decentralization (Regressions 4.2, 4.5 and 4.7). Accordingly,
decentralization of public expenditure has a negative and robust impact on national
economic performance across the OECD between 1990 and 2005.
Considering the possibility of a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth (Thießen, 2003), we incorporated the
square of the measure of fiscal decentralization employed as an additional regressor.
However, as the results in regressions 4.4 and 4.6 of Table 4 indicate, the corresponding
coefficient was not statistically significant.
Administrative decentralization, as measured by Schneider (2003), also matters for
growth. The association between both variables is negative and significant (Regression
4.2). Nevertheless, some caution is required when interpreting this result, since in the
full model the coefficient of the indicator of the level of administrative decentralization
Table 4. The impact of the degree of decentralization of total expenditure on economic growth
Explanatory variables (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7)
Constant 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.058 0.067* 0.069* 0.080** 0.219***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.043)
Fiscal decentralization:
total expenditure
0.029*** 0.019** 0.052*** 0.090* 0.051*** 0.092* 0.031***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.049) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011)
(Fiscal decentralization:
total expenditure)2
0.045 0.049
(0.052) (0.051)
Political decentralization
(Schneider)
0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Political decentralization
(Hooghe et al.)
0.002**
(0.001)
Administrative
decentralization
0.022** 0.011* 0.011* 0.010
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP per capita (log) 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.011** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Physical capital 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Human capital 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population growth 0.489 0.501 0.317 0.332 0.701**
(0.380) (0.388) (0.336) (0.344) (0.309)
Trade openness 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Public sector size 0.016** 0.019** 0.012 0.015* 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
F-test 10.50*** 5.65*** 6.56*** 5.57*** 5.88*** 5.08*** 8.62***
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.145 0.315 0.316 0.336 0.338 0.457
Countries 21 21 20 20 20 20 19
Observations 231 231 220 220 220 220 209
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the average growth of real per capita GDP over 5-year
periods. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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is statistically significant only at the 10% level (Regression 4.6) and the variable is
non-significant when introducing Hooghe et al.’s (2008) index of political decentral-
ization (Regression 4.7). The impact of political decentralization on national economic
performance is affected by the choice of variable. When using Schneider’s (2003)
political decentralization index, the coefficient is not statistically significant in any case,
which appears to suggest that the degree to which the central government allows
subcentral entities to carry out the political functions of governance does not affect
economic growth (Regressions 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6). If we resort to Hooghe et al.’s (2008)
political decentralization indicator (Regression 4.7), the coefficient in contrast points
to—as in the case of fiscal and administrative decentralization—a negative and
statistically significant relationship with economic growth, reinforcing the view that
decentralization seems to have a detrimental effect on economic performance.
The various variables included in vector X tend to display the expected coefficients.
The coefficient of initial GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant in all the
specifications considered, indicating the existence of a process of conditional conver-
gence across the sample countries (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). The
analysis carried out also reveals that the stock of physical and human capital, and the
degree of trade openness are positively correlated with the dependent variable, while the
population growth rate is not statistically significant, with the exception of Regression
4.7 (Table 4). Finally, the negative relationship observed between the subnational share
in total government expenditure and economic performance is not affected by the
inclusion of public sector size in the analysis. This variable is not statistically significant
when the indicators of the degree of political and administrative decentralization are
taken into account in the estimation of the model (Table 4).
In order to confirm whether the negative link between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth is robust, the analysis presented in Table 4 is repeated using the
subnational share in total government revenue as the proxy for the degree of fiscal
decentralization across the OECD. The results are shown in Table 5. In all cases higher
levels of decentralized revenues are associated with lower growth rates in the ensuing
years, which is in line with the empirical evidence provided by Table 4. Likewise, the
coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are basically a carbon copy of those
presented in Table 4. Administrative decentralization is negatively connected with
economic performance and the relationship between political decentralization and
growth is affected by the choice of indicator: Schneider’s (2003) political decentraliza-
tion index is completely dissociated from economic performance, while Hooghe et al.’s
(2008) indicator displays, once again, a negative and significant coefficient (Table 5).
The control variables included in the analysis have similar coefficients to those
discussed in Table 4, the only exception being the coefficient of the indicator of the
public sector size, which is now positive and statistically significant in the full model,
but not in Regression 5.7 (Table 5).
This negative association between fiscal decentralization and economic performance
may be the consequence, as stated in the theoretical section, of differences in policy
preferences by subnational governments, which may undermine overall growth
potential. In order to test whether this is the case, we investigate, following
Rodrı´guez-Pose et al. (2009), the role played in this context by current and capital
expenditures. We estimate model (1) again, replacing the measures of fiscal decentral-
ization employed so far with the subnational share in total government current
expenditure and the subnational share in total government capital expenditure.
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Preferences for capital expenditure to the detriment of current expenditure are expected
to have a higher impact on subsequent growth. Conversely, preferences for current
expenditure may be detrimental for growth (Devrajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999).
As shown in Table 6, the results of this analysis allow us to partially qualify our
previous findings. With respect to the degree of decentralization of current expenditure,
our estimates reveal the presence of an inverted U-shaped link between this variable and
economic growth. Accordingly, the relationship under study is positive when the level
of decentralization of current expenditure is increasing from relatively low levels, but
beyond a certain threshold it turns negative. This raises the possibility of using the
decentralization of current expenditure as a means to increase economic growth
in relatively centralized countries, but also highlights the economic risks associated
with increases in current expenditure in highly decentralized countries. By contrast, the
results for the degree of decentralization of capital expenditure do not provide any
evidence of a non-linear link with growth. The coefficient of this variable is in all cases
negative and statistically significant, as occurs with the measures of fiscal decentral-
ization employed in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 5. The impact of the degree of decentralization of total revenue on economic growth
Explanatory variables (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7.)
Constant 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.061 0.070* 0.075* 0.087** 0.236***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
Fiscal decentralization:
total revenue
0.025*** 0.017** 0.031*** 0.064 0.029*** 0.072* 0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.043) (0.009) (0.039) (0.008)
(Fiscal decentralization:
total revenue)2
0.037 0.050
(0.048) (0.042)
Political decentralization
(Schneider)
0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Political decentralization
(Hooghe et al.)
0.003***
(0.001)
Administrative
decentralization
0.023** 0.015** 0.016** 0.011*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP per capita (log) 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Physical capital 0.009** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.007** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Human capital 0.002** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population growth 0.576 0.602* 0.439 0.474 0.721**
(0.401) (0.362) (0.348) (0.358) (0.314)
Trade openness 0.011** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Public sector size 0.020** 0.022* 0.015** 0.018** 0.002
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.146 0.258 0.258 0.285 0.288 0.444
F-test 9.67*** 5.75*** 5.31*** 6.22*** 4.98*** 4.21*** 7.82***
Countries 21 21 20 20 20 20 19
Observations 231 231 220 220 220 220 209
Notes: See Table 4.
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The division of subnational expenditure between current and capital expenditure
affects the coefficients of political and administrative decentralization (Table 6). Using
Schneider’s (2003) index, the degree of political decentralization now seems to exert a
positive influence on economic growth, while the degree of administrative decentral-
ization is not statistically significant in most cases. But this association of political
decentralization with economic growth is sensitive to the choice of index used. When
resorting to Hooghe et al.’s (2008) index, the impact of political decentralization is
marginally negative and significant, when controlling for the fiscal decentralization of
current expenditures, and negative but not significant, when controlling for capital
expenditures (Table A1 in appendix). As in the case of the results reported in Tables 4
and 5, the effect of these variables on economic growth is contingent on the measure of
decentralization used.
By threading at a finer level and considering the impact of the subnational share in
total government expenditure on economic affairs, health, education and social
protection, we aim to complete the picture and further analyse the robustness of our
previous findings. These four decentralization indicators are included as explanatory
variables in model (1). The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
The estimates carried out reveal that the coefficients of these variables are negative
and statistically significant in all cases, regardless of the controls used in the analysis.
This confirms the existence of a negative relationship between the level of the
decentralization of these types of expenditure and the dependent variable. That is, the
level of decentralization of expenditure on economic affairs, health, education and
social protection is negatively correlated with economic growth. Likewise, the empirical
evidence supplied by Tables 7 and 8 does not suggest the presence of a non-linear link
between these measures of fiscal decentralization and economic performance in the
sample countries.
Finally, it is worth noting that different preferences for expenditure among
subnational governments affect the link between political and fiscal decentralization
and economic growth and that this relationship is, once again, contingent on the choice
of indicator. When resorting to Schneider’s (2003) index, political decentralization is
positively and significantly associated with growth in the cases of territories with a
preference for expenditure on economics affairs and education, but not in the case of
health and social protection (Tables 7 and 8). Using Hooghe et al.’s (2008) index,
political decentralization is negatively connected to economic performance in the cases
of preferences for health, education and social protection expenditure, but not in cases
of preferences for economic affairs expenditure (Tables A2 and A3 in appendix).
5. Concluding remarks
The aim of the article has been to tackle the question of whether fiscal decentralization
is beneficial for economic growth or not. The often positive way in which fiscal
decentralization has been portrayed by proponents of devolution—almost as a solution
to the economic ills of well-off and lagging-behind regions alike—has for long
contrasted with the contradicting results of the scholarly analyses which have delved
into the question from different perspectives and in different parts of the world.
We have hence sought to revisit this matter from a somewhat distinct angle to that of
previous studies. First, we have concentrated our analysis on a group of relatively
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wealthy nations belonging to the OECD for the period 1990–2005. While this sort of
approach is not new (cf. Thießen, 2003; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009), it
has the advantage of reducing the noise that the comparison of countries with widely
diverse starting points and levels of wealth would introduce. Second and perhaps most
importantly, we have approached fiscal decentralization not as a unique, self-standing
phenomenon, but one which is inserted in a broader process of decentralization.
Decentralization is by no means dominated by revenue and expenditure issues and
it is often the case that political and administrative decisions play an equal, if not
more important role, in decisions about whether to decentralize further or not. As a
consequence, we have introduced a number of measures of political and administrative
decentralization into the analysis, in order to unveil the interaction among these three
types of decentralization and between them and economic performance. Third, as a
means to check the robustness of the results, the article considers both the expenditure
and the revenue side of fiscal decentralization, as well as, within the expenditure side,
how different the various expenditure preferences of subnational governments—
ranging from current to capital expenditure and more specifically focusing on
preference by subnational governments for economic affairs, health, education or
welfare expenditure—affect the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic performance. Finally, as an additional robustness test, we control for a
series of structural factors which have traditionally been regarded as influencing
economic performance.
The results of the analysis highlight that, given the recent levels of fiscal
decentralization of the countries of the OECD, fiscal decentralization seems to be
causing more harm than good from a growth perspective. The connection between fiscal
decentralization and economic performance is negative, significant and robust to the
inclusion of measurements of political and administrative decentralization and of a
number of control variables. It is also not affected by whether we are looking at the
expenditure or the revenue side of decentralization or by preferences for specific types
of expenditure by subnational governments. The association also seems to be linear,
with little indication of an inverted U-shaped relationship: the negative impact of
decentralization on economic growth rises as countries in the OECD intensify the fiscal
decentralization process. And this negative relationship happens regardless of whether
decentralized governments display preferences for capital or current expenditure or feel
more inclined to promote health, education, welfare expenditure or choose expenditure
in economic affairs. The only exception to this trend occurs in cases of preferences for
current expenditure in relatively low levels of fiscal decentralization. In these cases there
is some margin of manoeuvre for governments, as moderate increases in fiscal
decentralization may have a positive impact on economic growth.
The negative association between fiscal decentralization and growth is more robust
than that between other types of decentralization and growth. Administrative
decentralization also tends to display a negative connection to economic performance,
although this connection is weaker and less robust than that of fiscal decentralization.
Political decentralization exhibits a relationship with economic growth that is highly
sensitive to the choice of measurement of political decentralization. With some types of
indicators political decentralization has a positive impact on economic growth, while,
with others, the connection is negative. But these differences linked to the choice of
indicators of political decentralization do not in any case affect the robustness of the
negative association between fiscal decentralization and growth.
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Overall, the analysis shows that, at least in the case of OECD countries, the potential
economic benefits of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic performance are
more than counterweighed by the potential economic pitfalls of transferring ever
greater resources to subnational tiers of government. Any potential benefits of fiscal
decentralization in the form of greater territorial cohesion (Rodrı´guez-Pose and
Ezcurra, 2010) are thus counterbalanced by lower aggregate growth. And political and
administrative measures of decentralization seem to be unable to offset this trend.
Hence, in the case of the OECD, while fiscal decentralization may still be an adequate
way to preserve and promote regional identity and culture, the claim that it will also
bring about some sort of economic dividend can be considered as questionable.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers, to Neil Wrigley, the editor, and to
participants in seminars in London, Madrid and Valencia for their useful comments to earlier
versions of the article. They will also like to thank Ramiro Gil Serrate for his work in the
compilation and the setting up of the database.
Funding
This research has benefited from the generous financial support of a Leverhulme Trust Major
Research Fellowship and of the Centro International de Estudios Econo´micos y Sociales (CIEES,
Madrid), of the PROCIUDAD-CM programme, and of the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Innovation (Project ECO2008-05072-C02-02/ECON). It is also part of the research programme
of the independent UK Spatial Economics Research Centre funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC), Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills, Communities and
Local Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government. The support of these funders is
acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
views of the funders.
References
Akai, N., Sakata, M. (2002) Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: evidence
from state-level cross-section data for the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 52:
93–108.
Barro, R.J. (1991) Economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 106: 407–444.
Barro, R.J., Lee, J.W. (2000) International data on educational attainment: updates and
implications. Working Paper No. 042, Center for International Development (CID), Harvard
University.
Barro, R.J., Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992) Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100: 407–443.
Baskaran, T., Feld, L.P. (2009) Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in OECD countries:
is there a relationship? CESIFO Working Paper No 2721.
Brennan, G., Buchanan, J.M. (1980) The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal
Constitution. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Breton, A. (1996) Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Davoodi, H., Zou, H. (1998) Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: a cross country study.
Journal of Urban Economics, 43: 244–257.
Devrajan, S, Swaroop, V., Zou, H.-F. (1996) The composition of public expenditure and
economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 37: 313–344.
Dillinger, W. (1994) Decentralization and its implications for urban service delivery. Urban
Management Program Discussion Paper 16, World Bank.
638 . Rodrı´guez-Pose and Ezcurra
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Donohue, J.D. (1997) Disunited States. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Ebel, R.D., Yilmaz, S. (2002) On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization. Policy
Research Working Paper 2809, World Bank.
Eusko Jaularitiza (2004) Razones econo´micas para un nuevo Marco Institucional
available at: http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-2312/es/contenidos/informes/
mem_razones_economicas/es_7465/razones_economicas.html [Accessed 28 June 2010].
Ezcurra, R., Pascual, P. (2008) The link between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities:
Evidence from several European Union countries. Environment and Planning A, 40: 1185–1201.
Frenkel, M. (1986) Federal Theory. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial
Relations, Australian National University.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A.H. (2008) Regional authority in 42 democracies, 1950–2006:
a measure and five hypotheses. Regional and Federal Studies, 18: 111–302.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A.H. (2010) The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative
Study of 42 Democracies (1950-2006). London: Routledge.
Iimi, A. (2005) Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note. Journal of
Urban Economics, 57: 449–461.
Inman, R.P., Rubinfeld, D. L. (2000) Federalism. In B. Bouckaert, G. de Geest (eds) The
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. V, pp. 661–691. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Klugman, J. (1994) Decentralisation: A Survey of Literature from a Human Development
Perspective. New York: United Nations Development Programme Occasional Paper 13
Human Development Report Office.
Kneller, R., Bleaney, M., Gemmell, N. (1999) Fiscal policy and growth: evidence from OECD
countries. Journal of Public Economics, 74: 171–190.
Lin, J.Y., Liu, Z. (2000) Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China. Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 49: 1–21.
Martı´nez-Va´zquez, J., McNab, R.M. (2003) Fiscal decentralization and economic growth. World
Development, 31: 1597–1616.
Marks, G., Hooghe, L. (2004) Contrasting visions of multi-level governance. In I. Bache,
M. Flinders (eds) Multi-level Governance, pp. 15–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKinnon, R (1997) Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American Monetary Union.
In M. Blejer, T. Ter-Minassian (eds) Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance: Essays in
Honour of Vito Tanzi, pp. 73–93. London: Routledge.
Mo, P.H. (2007) Government expenditures and economic growth: the supply and demand sides.
Fiscal Studies, 28: 497–522.
Morgan, K. (2002) The English question: regional perspectives on a fractured nation. Regional
Studies, 36: 797–810.
Newey, W.K., West, K.D. (1987) Hypothesis testing with efficient method of moments
estimation. International Economic Review, 28: 777–787.
Newey, W.K., West, K.D. (1994) Automatic lag selection in covariance matrix estimation. Review
of Economic Studies, 61: 631–653.
Oates, W. (1972) Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates, W. (1985) Searching for Leviathan: an empirical analysis. American Economic Review, 75:
748–757.
Oates, W. (1993) Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal,
XLVI: 237–243.
Odero, K.K. (2004) PRSPs in Decentralized Contexts: Comparative Lessons on Local Planning
and Fiscal Dimensions, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
Prud’homme, R. (1995) The dangers of decentralization. World Bank Research Observer, 10:
201–220.
Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Ram, R. (1986) Government size and economic growth: a new framework and some evidence
from cross-section and time series data. American Economic Review, 76: 191–203.
Rodden, J. (2004) Comparative federalism and decentralization: on meaning and measurement.
Comparative Politics, 36: 481–500.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Bwire, A. (2004) The economic (in)efficiency of devolution. Environment and
Planning A, 36: 1907–1928.
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth . 639
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Ezcurra, R. (2010) Does decentralization matter for regional disparities?
A cross-country analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, E-pub: 22 September 2009,
doi:10.1093/jeg/lbp049.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Gill, N. (2003) The global trend towards devolution and its implications.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 21: 333–351.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Gill, N. (2004) Is there a global link between regional disparities and
devolution? Environment and Planning A, 36: 2097–2117.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Gill, N. (2005) On the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution. Regional Studies,
39: 405–420.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Sandall, R. (2008) From identity to the economy: analysing the evolution of
the decentralisation discourse. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26: 54–72.
Rodrı´guez-Pose, A., Tijmstra, S., Bwire, A. (2009) Fiscal decentralisation, efficiency, and growth.
Environment and Planning A, 41: 2041–2062.
Sala-i-Martin, X., Doppelhofer, G., Miller, R.I. (2004) Determinants of long-term growth: a
Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach. American Economic Review, 94:
813–835.
Sapir, A. et al. (2004) An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Schneider, A. (2003) Decentralization: conceptualization and measurement. Studies in
Comparative International Development, 38: 32–56.
Stansel, D. (2005) Local decentralization and local economic growth: a cross-sectional
examination of US metropolitan areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 57: 55–72.
Stegarescu, D. (2005) Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent
international trends. Fiscal Studies, 26: 301–333.
Storper, M. (2005) Society, community and economic development. Studies in Comparative
International Development, 39: 30–57.
Tiebout, C.M. (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy, 64:
416–424.
Thießen, U. (2003) Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in high-income OECD
countries. Fiscal Studies, 24: 237–274.
Thornton, J. (2007) Fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered. Journal of Urban
Economics, 61: 64–70.
Tomaney, J. (2002) The evolution of regionalism in England. Regional Studies, 36: 721–731.
Woller, G.M., Phillips, K. (1998) Fiscal decentralization and IDC economic growth: an empirical
investigation. Journal of Development Studies, 34: 139–148.
World Bank, (2000) World Development Report 1999/2000. Entering the 21st Century.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zhang, T., Zou, H. (1998) Fiscal decentralization, public spending and economic growth in
China. Journal of Public Economics, 67: 221–240.
Zhang, T., Zou, H. (2001) The growth impact of intersectoral and intergovernmental
allocation of public expenditure: with applications to China and India. China Economic
Review, 2: 58–81.
640 . Rodrı´guez-Pose and Ezcurra
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
T
h
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
cu
rr
en
t
a
n
d
ca
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
o
n
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
g
ro
w
th
(u
si
n
g
H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
,
2
0
0
8
)
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(A
1
.1
)
(A
1
.2
)
(A
1
.3
)
(A
1
.4
)
(A
1
.5
)
(A
1
.6
)
(A
1
.7
)
(A
1
.8
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.2
4
3
*
*
*
0
.2
6
9
*
*
*
0
.2
4
3
*
*
*
0
.2
7
8
*
*
*
0
.2
5
3
*
*
*
0
.2
5
1
*
*
*
0
.2
2
0
*
*
*
0
.2
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
cu
rr
en
t
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
4
5
*
*
*
0
.0
7
2
*
*
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
8
5
*
*
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
3
4
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
cu
rr
en
t
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.1
0
9
*
*
*
0
.1
1
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ca
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
2
1
*
*
0
.0
4
4
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ca
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
2
5
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
)
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
0
.0
1
2
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
2
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
(l
o
g
)
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
P
h
y
si
ca
l
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
H
u
m
a
n
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
ro
w
th
0
.8
8
9
*
*
*
0
.6
2
2
*
*
0
.7
0
5
*
*
0
.5
7
5
*
*
1
.2
1
5
*
*
*
1
.2
1
9
*
*
*
1
.0
2
7
*
*
*
0
.9
4
8
*
*
*
(0
.3
4
4
)
(0
.2
9
8
)
(0
.3
0
1
)
(0
.2
7
5
)
(0
.3
8
0
)
(0
.3
8
0
)
(0
.3
5
5
)
(0
.3
4
3
)
T
ra
d
e
o
p
en
n
es
s
0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
P
u
b
li
c
se
ct
o
r
si
ze
0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
2
1
*
*
0
.0
2
1
*
*
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.4
3
3
0
.4
9
5
0
.4
6
9
0
.5
1
1
0
.4
2
0
0
.4
1
7
0
.4
2
9
0
.4
3
0
F
te
st
9
.4
7
*
*
*
9
.3
6
*
*
*
8
.3
6
*
*
*
8
.1
0
*
*
*
6
.2
4
*
*
*
5
.4
0
*
*
*
5
.1
6
*
*
*
4
.8
3
*
*
*
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
0
9
2
0
9
2
0
9
2
0
9
1
7
6
1
7
6
1
7
6
1
7
6
N
o
te
:
S
ee
T
a
b
le
4
.
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth . 641
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
T
a
b
le
A
2
.
T
h
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
a
ff
a
ir
s
a
n
d
h
ea
lt
h
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
o
n
g
ro
w
th
(u
si
n
g
H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
,
2
0
0
8
)
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(A
2
.1
)
(A
2
.2
)
(A
2
.3
)
(A
2
.4
)
(A
2
.5
)
(A
2
.6
)
(A
2
.7
)
(A
2
.8
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.3
2
3
*
*
*
0
.3
3
3
*
*
*
0
.3
2
0
*
*
*
0
.3
3
2
*
*
*
0
.1
5
9
*
*
*
0
.1
5
6
*
*
*
0
.1
7
9
*
*
*
0
.1
8
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
a
ff
a
ir
s
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
3
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
a
ff
a
ir
s
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.0
6
7
*
0
.0
6
7
*
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
h
ea
lt
h
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
1
2
*
*
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
h
ea
lt
h
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
0
.0
1
6
*
*
0
.0
1
5
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
(l
o
g
)
0
.0
3
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
9
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
P
h
y
si
ca
l
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
0
*
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
H
u
m
a
n
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
ro
w
th
1
.4
2
0
*
*
*
1
.4
2
7
*
*
*
1
.2
0
1
*
*
*
1
.2
3
5
*
*
*
1
.4
4
3
*
*
*
1
.3
8
8
*
*
*
0
.9
6
2
*
*
*
0
.9
7
8
*
*
*
(0
.3
5
1
)
(0
.3
5
1
)
(0
.3
7
4
)
(0
.3
7
8
)
(0
.4
6
5
)
(0
.4
5
3
)
(0
.3
3
6
)
(0
.3
3
4
)
T
ra
d
e
o
p
en
n
es
s
0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
P
u
b
li
c
se
ct
o
r
si
ze
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.4
8
6
0
.4
9
5
0
.5
0
6
0
.5
1
5
0
.3
4
6
0
.3
5
2
0
.4
5
7
0
.4
5
5
F
te
st
8
.9
6
*
*
*
8
.6
9
*
*
*
7
.8
7
*
*
*
7
.9
4
*
*
*
5
.7
9
*
*
*
5
.3
6
*
*
*
6
.6
8
*
*
*
6
.1
2
*
*
*
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
N
o
te
:
S
ee
T
a
b
le
4
.
642 . Rodrı´guez-Pose and Ezcurra
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
T
a
b
le
A
3
.
T
h
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
n
d
so
ci
a
l
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
o
n
g
ro
w
th
(u
si
n
g
H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
,
2
0
0
8
)
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(A
3
.1
)
(A
3
.2
)
(A
3
.3
)
(A
3
.4
)
(A
3
.5
)
(A
3
.6
)
(A
3
.7
)
(A
3
.8
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.2
5
4
*
*
*
0
.2
4
4
*
*
*
0
.2
5
2
*
*
*
0
.2
4
3
*
*
*
0
.2
1
3
*
*
*
0
.1
8
1
*
*
*
0
.2
3
4
*
*
*
0
.2
1
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
4
1
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
1
8
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
so
ci
a
l
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
5
1
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
3
4
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(F
is
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
so
ci
a
l
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
)2
0
.0
5
7
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
4
0
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(H
o
o
g
h
e
et
a
l.
)
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
d
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
1
4
*
0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
(l
o
g
)
0
.0
3
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
P
h
y
si
ca
l
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
6
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
H
u
m
a
n
ca
p
it
a
l
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
ro
w
th
0
.6
3
7
*
*
0
.6
4
0
*
0
.6
0
1
*
0
.6
0
2
*
1
.1
1
7
*
*
1
.1
2
7
*
*
*
0
.7
3
5
*
*
0
.7
9
7
*
*
(0
.3
2
1
)
(0
.3
2
9
)
(0
.3
2
2
)
(0
.3
2
7
)
(0
.4
3
5
)
(0
.4
1
9
)
(0
.3
4
9
)
(0
.3
5
7
)
T
ra
d
e
o
p
en
n
es
s
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
P
u
b
li
c
se
ct
o
r
si
ze
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
2
1
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.4
3
8
0
.4
4
0
0
.4
5
3
0
.4
5
3
0
.3
2
5
0
.3
3
4
0
.4
2
5
0
.4
2
7
F
te
st
8
.7
4
*
*
*
8
.5
0
*
*
*
7
.7
3
*
*
*
7
.7
8
*
*
*
5
.2
1
*
*
*
4
.7
3
*
*
*
6
.2
1
*
*
*
5
.3
8
*
*
*
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
1
9
8
N
o
te
:
S
ee
T
a
b
le
4
.
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth . 643
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on D
ecem
ber 18, 2014
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
